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ELIMINATION OF APARTHEID AND ESTABLISHMENT OF A UNITED, DEMOCRATIC AND NON-RACIAL SOUTH AFRICA

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-ninth year

Letter dated 31 March 1994 from the Chairman of the Special Committee against Apartheid to the Secretary-General

In accordance with the programme of work of the Special Committee against Apartheid for 1994 and in my capacity as its Chairman, I undertook, together with a small delegation of the Committee, a mission to South Africa from 28 February to 6 March 1994. I have the honour to enclose herewith the report of the mission.

I would be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 38, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ibrahim A. GAMBARI
Chairman
Special Committee against
Apartheid

ANNEX

Special Committee against Apartheid

Report of the Chairman of the Special Committee against Apartheid on his mission to South Africa, 28 February to 6 March 1994

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. The year 1993 was significant in several aspects of the political history of South Africa. It was marked by a high level of political violence resulting in thousands of deaths and widespread destruction of property. While no part of the country was spared, the violence was particularly pronounced in Natal.

2. 1993 was also a year of frequent strikes and boycotts. In this regard, "the chalk-down strike embarked upon by the South African Democratic Teacher's Union worsened the educational crisis, especially within the Black community. The stringent actions taken by the National Education, Health and Allied Workers' Union, a Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) affiliate, devastated health services in several hospitals". 1/ All these actions had an impact on the state of the economy which was still struggling with the consequences of recession and, in the absence of adequate domestic and external resources, was unable to respond to the needs of essential sectors such as housing and employment.

3. In the political field, the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), the Afrikaner Volksfront (Afrikaner People's Front) including, prominently, the Conservative Party (CP), and other right-wing organizations kept out of the multi-party negotiation process, which had already produced dramatic agreements, among them a decision that South Africa's first democratic and non-racial elections would be held at the end of April 1994. A most important agreement was also reached by the negotiators on an interim constitution, which was subsequently passed into law by a special session of Parliament at the end of 1993. With these agreements, together with an electoral bill and the bills adopted in October to enact the Transitional Executive Council (TEC), the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), the Independent Broadcasting Authority and the Independent Media Commission, the whole transition package was in place.

4. However, as the year 1993 ran its course the problem of legitimacy of the security forces still lingered on and it was generally agreed that the newly established TEC should seek ways to make those forces acceptable to the majority of citizens so as to enable them to deal more effectively with the continuing upsurge of political violence.

5. The developments cited above are, undoubtedly, positive steps on the long road to freedom in South Africa. None the less, there are reasons for caution and vigilance on the part of the international community. The negotiating process has been marred by incessant political violence. The continuing opposition of white right-wing organizations as well as of IFP to the transition process and, in particular, to the forthcoming elections, may still have serious consequences for South Africa.

6. The resolutions on the question of South Africa adopted by the General Assembly at its forty-eighth session took these developments into account, as did the resolution adopted by the Assembly on the programme of work of the Special Committee against Apartheid, which was mandated to continue to

follow closely developments in South Africa with a view to facilitating a peaceful and stable transition in that country.

7. In pursuance of its mandate, the Special Committee undertook a high-level fact-finding Mission to South Africa between 28 February and 6 March 1994. In addition, the Mission was to underline the Committee's support to the people of South Africa and their political leadership in their efforts to bring all parties into the process and conduct the elections as scheduled in an atmosphere free from violence and intimidation.

8. The Mission, which was led by the Chairman of the Special Committee against Apartheid, Mr. Ibrahim A. Gambari (Nigeria), also included Mr. Kofi Awoonor, Permanent Representative of Ghana to the United Nations and Chairman of the Subcommittee on the Implementation of United Nations Resolutions on South Africa; Mrs. Narcisa L. Escaler, Permanent Representative of the Philippines to the United Nations and Mr. Abdullahi A. Omaki (Nigeria). Mr. Johan Nordenfelt, Director, Programmes against Apartheid and for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat, and Ms. Shenaz Nagji, from the Centre against Apartheid of the Secretariat, accompanied the Mission.

9. Members of the Mission were able to travel to Cape Town, Johannesburg, Pretoria, East London and Port Elizabeth, where, apart from holding wide consultations, they could update themselves on the current situation on the ground. In particular, members were fully briefed by the Chairman and members of IEC, the Chairman of the Commission of Inquiry regarding the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation (Goldstone Commission), the Chairman of the National Peace Secretariat, and representatives of the Independent Forum on Electoral Education (IFEE), Matla Trust and the Institute for a Democratic Alternative in South Africa (IDASA). Furthermore, members of the Mission received detailed briefings by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, and by the leaders of the observer teams of the Commonwealth, the European Union and the Organization of African Unity (OAU). They were also briefed by the United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA)-coordinated observer teams in East London and Port Elizabeth, where, in addition, they met with representatives of the local Peace Committees.

10. The members of the Mission also had the opportunity to follow the proceedings of TEC which, it may be recalled, was established in October 1993 to supervise Government policies in crucial areas in the period leading up to the elections. The members of the Mission further had an opportunity to attend the parliamentary session at which amendments to the interim constitution were presented and adopted.

11. A schedule of the meetings held by the team in South Africa is annexed to the present report.

II. OVERVIEW OF THE MISSION

12. At the beginning of the meetings, the Chairman stressed that this, as in the case of the Committee's first visit in 1993, was a fact-finding mission. This time it would focus more specifically on the preparations for the April elections. The Chairman, therefore, indicated that the Mission was particularly interested in gathering information on such issues as the general arrangements for the elections, voter education, safety conditions at the polling stations and their location, evaluation of the role of the international election observers and monitors, violence and the role of the peace structures, as well as the role of the international community after the elections. All these points would need to be addressed in the final report of the Committee to the General Assembly.

A. General arrangements for the election

13. There is no question that the agreement on the interim constitution reached by the multi-party negotiation process last November and the establishment of TEC have been vital steps in the transition to democracy in South Africa. A successful election is, without doubt, the next critical step in this historic process.

14. In the course of discussions with major political actors, the Mission was informed that many favoured an election that would be as inclusive as possible. This, it was reasoned, was the surest way of guaranteeing peace and stability after the elections and for the latter to act as a turning point for growth and stability. There was great concern regarding the alliance of IFP and right-wing parties within the Freedom Alliance, whose boycott of the elections posed a real danger for the transition process.

15. The magnitude of the task of holding free and fair elections in South Africa for the first time implies that all sectors of the country's society will have to contribute to their success. IEC has expressed its determination to conduct the elections with such transparency as to ensure early and lasting reconciliation among contending parties. This determination will hopefully incite political leaders, at this historic juncture, to act in the interest of the country and to allow the estimated 22 to 23 million voters to cast their votes freely.

16. In addition to the efforts undertaken by IEC in this process, the business community, having played an active role in the resumption of multi-party negotiations, continues to assist the process of transition by attempting to ensure the following:

"(a) That the elections will have a high level of participation;

"(b) That the outcome of the elections will be accepted by both victors and losers;

"(c) That the elections will take place without violence and intimidation;

"(d) That the elections will be conducted in an efficient manner and will be well-managed;

"(e) That the elections will be well-monitored". 2/

17. Many underlined the difficulty of achieving these objectives due to the country's history, which was compounded by emerging new obstacles. South Africa is one of the few countries where elections will be conducted without a voter's roll and where the only qualification required will be the possession of a voter's identification card. Consequently, prospective voters will be free to cast their votes at any of the nearly 10,000 voting stations, as well as at 650 mobile stations, across the country. The authorities overseeing the running of the elections will, therefore, have to "over-cater for the prospective voters". 3/ The huge costs involved are, for now, estimated at 155 million rand per day. 4/ Another factor to be considered is the difficulty to establish proper communications. IEC is nevertheless confident that its members and staff nationwide will carry out this historic task successfully.

B. Voter education

18. A comprehensive and well-designed education programme for first-time voters is a vital ingredient for the outcome of elections in a country where 60 per cent of the population is believed to be functionally illiterate. Such a programme must address the issue of guarantees for peaceful voting and the security of votes. In addition, the programme ought to attempt to restore the confidence of victims of apartheid in their ability to choose and run their government.

19. IFEE, one of several organizations involved in this programme, informed the Mission that it had so far trained 2,000 people, who were in turn currently training others, with the help of pamphlets as well as radio programmes.

20. The Consultative Business Movement has also thrown its weight behind the voter-education programme by creating a Business Election Fund (BEF). The key objectives of the Fund include:

"(a) To inspire the electorate from a non-partisan business perspective to participate in the election process;

"(b) To support, reinforce and promote political tolerance, freedom of association and assembly and the secrecy of the ballot among the electorate and political parties;

"(c) To provide a vision and underline the positive potential of a truly free and fair election for stability, growth and democracy;

"(d) To observe, reinforce and support the efforts of those organizations, such as the IEC, set up to organize, supervise and adjudicate a free and fair election". 5/

21. To achieve the above objectives, BEF has indicated that it will conduct a targeted non-partisan public relations and communications campaign. It will also mobilize networks, infrastructures and resources to promote support of and participation in a free and fair election. The campaign will be conducted in cooperation with IEC and organizations such as IFEE and the Democratic Broadcasting Initiative.

22. The most impressive voter education materials seen by the Mission were probably those presented by the Matla Trust. The posters and brochures were simple and easy to follow for voters, a majority of whom will vote by identifying symbols rather than reading names. The Matla Trust voter education package, if widely available, is indeed capable of getting the right message across to first-time voters.

23. However, from the Mission's interactions, it was clear that voter education has not yet reached the vast majority of the people, especially women and those who live in rural areas. IEC appears confident that, despite the time constraint, it will be able to reach out to the entire voting population before the date of the election. It is therefore noted with particular satisfaction that, after the Mission had concluded its visit to South Africa, IEC organized a national conference on voter education programmes for women.

24. Concerns have also been raised about the vast majority of potential voters who are yet to be issued with voting identification cards. While IEC was extremely confident that issuance of such cards would take less than five minutes for each, a large number of voters were still finding the formality preceding the issuance of the cards not only cumbersome but also slow and difficult. Doubts were raised as to the ability of IEC to issue such documentation in time to an estimated 23 million voters.

C. Voting stations: location and safety

25. The Mission was informed that the elections would be conducted between the hours of 7 a.m and 7 p.m on 26, 27 and 28 April 1994. While 26 April has been set aside as Special Voting Day to take care of voters outside South Africa as well as of prisoners, those in hospitals and on farms and older people, 27 and 28 April are marked as days for general voting for both the national and provincial elections. To enhance participation, 27 April has been declared a public holiday.

26. All South African citizens and permanent residents who are 18 years and older will be eligible to vote. It is projected that "between 21 and 23 million people will participate in this historic exercise, which will be organized and supervised by 160,000 election officials, all of them South Africans. The voting stations are now, as a result of the acceptance of double balloting, projected to be about 10,000 in addition to 650 mobile stations. The international elections observers are now projected to be between 2,000 and 5,000 at the peak of the electioneering, while 30,000 local monitors and about 10,000 IEC supervisors will be required". 6/ Barring unforeseen circumstances, it is presumed that these layers of officials and representatives

from contesting political parties, as well as the defence forces, will guarantee the minimum security needed at each voting station.

27. IEC officials have also stressed that efforts are currently being made to ensure that ballot boxes do not travel more than five miles to counting and other collation centres. It is reasoned that the shorter the distance for movement of ballot boxes, the greater the chances of ensuring their safety.

D. Peace structures

28. It may be recalled that the National Peace Accord, which was signed in September 1991, provided for a code of conduct to be observed both by the police forces and by political parties and organizations in the exercise of their right to free political activities. The code aims at avoiding conflicts and the structures set up under the Accord are designed to help peaceful settlement of disputes between its signatories.

29. It appeared to the Mission that the peace structures were getting weaker and, consequently, were not able to respond to cases of violence and other acts of intimidation. There is no doubt, however, that these structures and the National Peace Accord itself still provide a generally acceptable framework for the overall examination of and dealing with the question of violence in South Africa. The Mission also felt that, as desirable as it was to strengthen the peace structures, that objective would be difficult as the elections become closer because political parties have continued to withdraw from these structures some of their high-level personnel needed for their own campaigns. Indeed, peace structures appear to be effective only where they are supported by the political parties and, as in the case of East London and Port Elizabeth, are easily accessed by the international observer groups whose presence, the Mission was assured, made a great deal of difference between peace and violence.

E. Violence and intimidation

30. The Mission was informed that a climate of widespread political intolerance, fear and politically inspired violence still reigns in South Africa. Although some violence had generally been anticipated, it has in the last few weeks increased beyond the levels expected. While present throughout the country, this violence is particularly acute in Natal province and the East Rand. Fears were expressed in some quarters that political violence in these areas, having exerted heavy tolls on human life and property, could erupt into a full-blown war and jeopardize the April elections.

31. The Mission was informed that the Government was, nevertheless, determined to ensure that elections took place as scheduled. One of the concerns expressed to the Mission was related to the persisting stockpiling by some elements, especially among the right-wing, of arms obtained through Swaziland and Mozambique. The war in Mozambique had resulted in the flooding of South Africa with assorted weapons sold at low prices. The Mission was also informed that the Government had tried to reverse this trend by buying off some of these weapons from the border between South Africa and Mozambique for subsequent

destruction. The Government further stressed that it had, of late, intensified border patrols aimed at discouraging this lucrative arms trade, while the police had offered to buy weapons from those that may have already succeeded in purchasing them from across the borders.

32. Fortunately, fears of a full-blown war resulting from political violence were not shared by the main political actors. Everyone appeared to agree that while political violence, which is likely to target specific individuals, will certainly increase in the run-up to the elections, violent-prone organizations were not sufficiently equipped or armed to engulf the entire country in a full-scale civil war. However, the Mission was informed that a "vigilante" force was being trained and armed in Natal/KwaZulu, and that this might constitute a more serious threat to elections in important areas there. The subsequent revelation by the Goldstone Commission of a destabilization conspiracy to derail the elections, involving senior officials of the South African police, IFP and the KwaZulu police, seems to confirm the seriousness of these concerns.

33. The Mission was also told that there was a real fear of intimidation by those who adamantly refused to take part in the forthcoming elections. The Government has repeatedly given assurances that it would protect all those who intend to exercise their democratic right on the days of voting and would assign that task to the defence forces. The recent events in Bophuthatswana are an indication that the Government's resolve can indeed have a decisive impact. While a majority agreed that the non-participation of key political actors in the elections, particularly IFP and CP, would harm the political process, all seemed determined that the elections should go on with or without them. Considering the distance travelled by the South Africans in the last four years, this appears to be a realistic position. IEC has also reaffirmed its resolve to carry on with the elections. While it was readily agreed that it was the democratic right of people or organizations not to participate in the elections, IEC stated that it would not condone blackmail or intimidation of others into non-participation. It recalled that it had the right, under the Electoral Act, to suspend voting at polling stations where such acts were manifest.

34. The Mission also learnt that not much progress had been made with the establishment of a national peace-keeping force, although its concept was supported by most political actors. The time remaining before the elections was not sufficient to complete the enlargement and retraining of this force. At present, only about 3,000 members were believed to have been trained, a number simply inadequate to maintain order and safety during the campaign and at the nearly 10,000 voting stations across the country. None the less, the idea of a national peace-keeping force is a commendable one, as it represents the beginning of an integration of the various armed forces, which needs to take place after the elections.

F. Constitutional amendment and more inclusive participation in the transitional process

35. In a further attempt to counter the difficulty of getting all the political parties to participate in the forthcoming elections, TEC agreed to significant amendments of the earlier approved interim constitution "even before it comes

into effect, as well as of the 1993 Election Act". 7/ The reason for proceeding in this unusual fashion was clearly stated by President F. W. de Klerk in his speech at the opening of Parliament on 28 February 1994: "It is essential that no one and no party should be able to claim that they are excluded or that their reasonable concerns have not been accommodated in the transitional constitution". 8/ The amendments were therefore adopted to address the fears and concerns of various parties of the Freedom Alliance and to enhance further the legitimacy of the constitution.

36. The concerns of the Freedom Alliance, now largely made up of three organizations, IFP, CP and the Afrikaanse Weerstandbeweging (AWB) the Afrikaner Resistance Movement), and shared by the breakaway Freedom Front, are as follows:

(a) That stronger assurance is needed on the question of autonomy of provinces, their powers, functions and boundaries;

(b) That a future government might try to diminish the powers of the provinces in the final constitution;

(c) That the provinces should be granted greater fiscal and financial autonomy;

(d) That there should be two separate ballots in the election, one for the national parliament and the other for the provincial legislatures;

(e) That the principle of self-determination for ethnic minorities should be included and provision should be made for a mechanism and process to consider the issue of an Afrikaner "Volkstaat";

(f) That the province of Natal should be known as KawZulu/Natal.

37. The amendments to the interim constitution were adopted by Parliament on 28 February 1994, at a session which the Mission was privileged to witness. They largely addressed the major concerns of the Freedom Alliance. Indeed, the leaders of parties engaged in the negotiations that led to these concessions deserve to be commended for making this endeavour in the hope of reaching out to their compatriots.

38. The fact that, despite these amendments, some members of the Freedom Alliance continue to withhold their participation in the elections is a clear testimony that they are simply not interested in such a participation. Their continuing threat of boycott will no doubt hamper the conduct of free and fair elections, especially in areas where the Alliance is strongest. Consequently, the Mission appreciates the commitment made by the Government to "use all the means at its disposal, including the security forces, to deal with any party which might seek to achieve its objectives through violence or through unconstitutional, illegal or undemocratic means". 9/

G. The dialogue between Mr. Nelson Mandela and Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi

39. While the Mission was in South Africa, the build-up to the widely reported meeting between the leadership of the African National Congress (ANC) and IFP assumed greater proportion. While everyone, in their contacts with the Mission, expressed the hope that the symbolic value of the meeting could help to calm down tensions in Natal, no one believed that it would be a real success. Its positive outcome, therefore, took the country by surprise and left the Freedom Alliance in an unexpected disarray. It will be recalled that the most important outcome of that meeting included:

(a) The acceptance by IFP to register provisionally for the elections, while continuing discussions on other matters;

(b) Exploring the possibilities of international mediation in an effort to resolve the deadlock over constitutional issues;

(c) Agreement to set up a task group to strengthen the Peace Committees. The task group should work out appropriate schedules of joint appearances at political rallies by the leadership of the two parties (ANC and IFP) to demonstrate the value of political tolerance.

40. As indicated, the impact of this meeting was shattering to those elements opposed to the April elections and led to a split in CP. Having failed to meet the deadline for submission of names of candidates, as required by the Electoral Act, IFP, CP and AWB will, regrettably, still not participate in the elections. However, breakaway members of the Alliance, including members of CP, have registered in time under the banner of the Freedom Front and will be participating in the elections.

41. As unfortunate as IFP's non-participation may be, the continuing dialogue between IFP and ANC is important in that it may still be capable of easing the level of violence and thereby enhancing the climate for political activity. Similarly, the lesson of the collapse of the Bophuthatswana leadership, the inability of AWB's forces to prevent it and the decisive intervention of the South African Defence Force (SADF) should be clear signals to those wishing to derail the transition process at this late hour.

H. The role of international observers

42. "UNOMSA is a unique application of preventive diplomacy." 10/ The Observer Mission was established on the basis of Security Council resolution 772 (1992) of 17 August 1992, and the international observers are required to render assistance to the structures set up under the National Peace Accord and to help end the violence, thereby supporting the efforts of the political leaders and people of South Africa in their legitimate struggle for a non-racial, non-sexist democratic society. Indeed, the presence of the international observers in the country has had a significant effect on the lives of average South Africans in terms of reducing the potential for violence.

43. The representatives of UNOMSA, as well as other international observers operating under its original and expanded mandate (Security Council resolution 894 (1994) of 14 January 1994), fully briefed the Mission as to the situation on the ground and outlined their projections as the countdown to the elections commences. UNOMSA is presently subdivided into two divisions corresponding to its double mandate, the first to monitor political violence and thus promote peace, and the second focusing on the elections. Briefing the Mission, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General stressed the significance and complementary nature of these two divisions. He added that the two units cooperate closely and that their daily operations reinforce each other.

44. The work of the observers from other international organizations such as the European Union, the Commonwealth and OAU, is coordinated by UNOMSA. It ought to be pointed out that the international observers are not the organizers of the elections, as was the case in Cambodia and Namibia. However, at the invitation of the relevant authorities and structures, they are actively engaged in all facets of the preparations for the elections. In this context, the international observers informed the Mission that they are currently working to achieve the following objectives:

(a) To help create confidence in and assure the transparency of the electoral process;

(b) To act as a deterrent to individuals and parties who might be tempted to tamper with the process;

(c) To provide domestic and international credibility for the outcome of the elections.

45. The international observers, whose total number is expected to rise to almost 3,000 at the time of the elections, are specifically charged with observing all aspects of the build-up to the election, including organization, voter information and education, campaigning and the election procedure on the polling days as well as the counting of the ballots. The Mission was told that the observers would attend political meetings and rallies as well as observe all aspects of the transition, including the activities of the police and other security forces, and that they would be available to all organizations wishing to discuss with them the transition process and, in particular, the elections.

46. While concern was expressed that the number of the international observers was inadequate in view of the nearly 10,000 polling stations in the country, the UNOMSA coordinating unit indicated to the Mission that observers would be rotated around the country to enable as much coverage of the polling stations as possible. In the areas most prone to violence such as Natal and the East Rand, observers would be stationed more permanently.

47. In addition to these extensive briefings by representatives of the international observers, the Mission visited Port Elizabeth and East London to apprise itself of the concrete arrangements on the ground. The Mission found that, in relatively conflict-free areas such as Port Elizabeth and East London, UNOMSA and other international observers were able to work very closely with

local peace structures without coming under any suspicion from some of the political parties.

III. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

48. The Mission benefited a great deal from its interactions with the various groups it met while in South Africa. From such interactions, the Mission forged a strong impression of the eagerness of the majority of South Africans to participate in the first ever multiracial elections in the country. In this spirit, they gave indications that they were prepared to withstand the stormy weeks ahead in order to create a new society free of apartheid in which all South Africans, irrespective of their race, can enjoy the prospects of living in harmony as equal citizens of a democratic country.

49. Despite this eagerness and optimism, a lot of concern is still being expressed about the political intolerance which has resulted in persistent violence across the country, in particular in Natal and the East Rand. There was and still is a concern about the determination of some factions of the Freedom Alliance, such as IFP and CP, to boycott the elections, thereby significantly raising the possibility that those who wish to exercise their rights to vote would be subjected to intimidation. The vigorous ejection of white vigilante nationalists from Bophuthatswana may have been a turning point towards holding free and fair elections in the country in April. The decisive action by white and black government forces on behalf of civil order appears to have weakened the resistance to multiracial elections as well as split the radical white separatist groups and isolated IFP and its chairman, Chief Buthelezi.

50. The business community, which has played a proactive role in the multi-party negotiations, has continued to play a vital role in voter education exercises and has demonstrated its commitment to the transition process. This is understandable since, if "the business of business is to remain in business", support for the creation of stable political conditions is essential.

51. Although several NGOs are actively engaged in voter education exercises, the Mission's observation is that the time seems too short for the largely illiterate population, and in particular women in the rural areas, to be reached before the elections. Furthermore, in spite of the confidence expressed by IEC, the realities on the ground in the areas visited by the Mission, and the complexities of the communication and other infrastructural problems in the rural areas of the country, do not easily lend support to its optimism.

52. One of the most problematic issues that may affect the election is the question of identity cards or other documentation for the purpose of voting. Prospective voter figures of 18 to 23 million are conjectural, as it appeared from various accounts, at the time of the Mission's visit that only half of the voters were adequately documented. It remains unclear how the remaining 9 to 12 million people would be able to receive proper documents before the elections.

53. The role of UNOMSA and other international observers has continued to be praised and warmly embraced by all sectors of the country. It is indeed evident that an excellent relationship exists between UNOMSA and other international observers as well as the Peace Committees in several regions of the country (except in the most violent areas of Natal and the East Rand). The presence of the international observers in South Africa has no doubt made a great deal of difference between peace and violence. Indeed, UNOMSA, under the able leadership of Mr. Brahimi and Ms. Angela King, is very well organized and is getting fully prepared for the huge task of observing the arrangements for the electioneering as well as the actual conduct of the elections. The Mission is confident that the presence, organization and commitment of UNOMSA as well as other international observers and their staff is an essential factor in helping to achieve successful democratic elections in the country.

54. Finally, the Mission was impressed by the seriousness, thoroughness and skill with which the members of TEC conducted their work. In its view, this augurs well for a future government of national unity. Furthermore, the Mission commends the political wisdom and flexibility demonstrated by the main participants in the Multi-Party Negotiating Council, who have undertaken significant endeavours, including amending the interim constitution, to encourage those who have chosen to remain outside of that framework to rejoin the electoral process.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

55. Based on the above, and taking into account some of the most recent developments in South Africa, the following is recommended:

(a) That UNOMSA, because of its infrastructural and logistical spread, as well as the length of its presence in South Africa, be supported in its role to coordinate the operations of all other international observers, including those from individual Member States, in the run-up to the elections;

(b) That UNOMSA and other international observers, as well as those from individual Member States, should intensify their efforts with regard to voter education, in cooperation with IEC and domestic NGOs;

(c) That the international community should continue to encourage the parties, to the extent possible, to work for all-inclusive elections;

(d) That the international community should not respond to calls for the postponement of the elections, as advocated by parties which are not firmly committed to non-racial and democratic elections. Such a postponement, no matter how brief, is unlikely to ensure the participation of all organizations in South Africa, and would, in our view, lead to an intensification of violence. Furthermore, any deferral would have serious financial implications at a time when there are clear signs of contribution fatigue by the international community;

(e) That the South African Government be urged to ensure, with the support of TEC, that the defence forces take such decisive action as will be needed to

forestall or minimize the level of violence as well as acts of intimidation of prospective voters across the country, especially in areas where levels of violence and intimidation are particularly high, such as Natal;

(f) That the United Nations, in cooperation with international agencies, should proceed with arrangements to convene a resource mobilization/donors conference in the near future, for the benefit of disadvantaged South Africans;

(g) That following one person-one vote elections and the establishment of a non-racial government and a constituent assembly/interim parliament, the General Assembly would need to consider the question of a resumption of the participation of South Africa in its work. In this context, the Assembly may wish to consider holding a special session to evaluate such communication as may have been received from a new government with regard to the question of South Africa's resumption of its seat at the Assembly.

Notes

1/ Institute for a Democratic Alternative in South Africa, Annual Report, 1992.

2/ Consultative Business Movement, Publication No. 14, 21 February 1994.

3/ Statement by Judge Johann Kriegler, International Briefing on South Africa's first democratic and non-racial elections, Brussels, 28 February-1 March 1994.

4/ Consultative Business Movement, Publication No. 14, 21 February 1994.

5/ Ibid.

6/ Ibid.

7/ Statement by Mr. Roelf Meyer, Constitutional Minister, to Parliament, 28 February 1994.

8/ Address by President F. W. de Klerk to Parliament, 28 February 1994.

9/ Ibid.

10/ Statement by Ms. Angela King, Chief of Mission, UNOMSA, Johannesburg, August 1993.

APPENDIX

List of meetings held by the team

Monday, 28 February 1994 (Cape Town)	Meetings with: National Coordinator of IFEE, Father Michael Weeder; Democratic Party leader, Mr. Zach de Beer. Attended Parliament's proceedings.
Tuesday, 1 March 1994 (Cape Town)	Observed proceedings of TEC, chaired by Mr. Zam Titus; meeting with IDASA Executive Director, Mr. Alex Boraine.
Wednesday, 2 March 1994 (Johannesburg)	Meetings with: IEC Chairman, Judge Johann Kriegler and IEC Commissioners Mr. Oscar Dhlomo and Mrs. Dawn Mokhobo; Chairman of the Commission of Inquiry regarding the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation, Justice Richard Goldstone; BEF representative, Mr. Colin Coleman.
Thursday, 3 March 1994 (Johannesburg)	Meetings with: Deputy Minister for Constitutional Affairs, Mr. F. Schoeman; Special Representative of the Secretary-General for South Africa, Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi; Special Representative of the OAU Secretary General, Ambassador Legwaila; Ambassador von Stulpnagel, Mr. Marshall and Mr. de Ruiter, representing respectively the European Community Observer Mission in South Africa, the Commonwealth Observer Mission in South Africa and the European Union; Mr. Thabo Mbeki, Chairman of the ANC; PAC President Mr. Clarence Makwetu and Foreign Secretary Mr. Gora Ibrahim; representatives of the Matla Trust, Mr. Terrence Tryon, Mr. B. Modise and Mr. Victor Ntojope; National Peace Secretariat Chairman, Mr. Antonie Gildenhuys.
Friday, 4 and Saturday, 5 March 1994	Visits to East London and Port Elizabeth and meetings with UNOMSA-coordinated observer teams and local Peace Committees.